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Abstract
To-date, forest resource-based carbon accounting in land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol (KP), European
Union (EU) and national level emission reduction schemes considers only a fraction of its potential and fails to
adequately mobilize the LULUCF sector for the successful stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG)
concentrations. Recent modifications at the 2011 COP17 meetings in Durban have partially addressed this basic
problem, but leave room for improvement. The presence of an Incentive Gap (IG) continues to justify reform of
the LULUCF carbon accounting framework. Frequently neglected in the climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion literature, carbon accounting practices ultimately define the nuts and bolts of what counts and which
resources (forest, forest-based or other) are favored and utilized. For Annex I countries in the Kyoto Mecha-
nism, the Incentive Gap under forest management (FM) is significantly large: some 75% or more of potential
forestry-based carbon sequestration is not effectively incentivized or mobilized for climate change mitigation
and adaptation (Ellison et al. 2011a). In this paper, we expand our analysis of the Incentive Gap to incorporate
the changes agreed in Durban and encompass both a wider set of countries and a larger set of omitted carbon
pools. For Annex I countries, based on the first 2 years of experience in the first Commitment Period (CP1) we
estimate the IG in FM at approximately 88%. Though significantly reduced in CP2, the IG remains a problem.
Thus our measure of missed opportunities under the Kyoto and UNFCCC framework – despite the changes in
Durban – remains important. With the exception perhaps of increased energy efficiency, few sinks or sources
of reduced emissions can be mobilized as effectively and efficiently as forests. Thus, we wonder at the sheer
magnitude of this underutilized resource.
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Introduction
Ellison et al. (2011a) identify a significant ‘Incentive
Gap’ (IG) in the European Union (EU), Kyoto Protocol
(KP), and United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) carbon accounting and
reporting frameworks for land use, land-use change,
and forestry (LULUCF). Because the carbon stored in
omitted carbon pools, managed forests, and harvested
wood products (HWP) is not adequately accounted
under current carbon accounting practices, strong
incentives for increased carbon sequestration and the
balanced and efficient use of forest resources are not in
place. Accounting practices under the UNFCCC, KP,
EU, and other national-level emission reduction
schemes thus fail to adequately mobilize the LULUCF
sector for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Moreover, each of these frameworks (UNFCCC, KP, EU,
and national-level strategies) employs different report-
ing and/or accounting conventions with significant and
potentially adverse impacts on how forest resources are
used (Ellison et al., 2011a: 1063). Recent LULUCF carbon
accounting reforms at the 2011 COP17/CMP7 meetings
in Durban have done little to change the basic
dimensions of this problem. Although some significant
progress has been made, the IG remains large.
The consequences are significant: continued global
warming and climate change threaten human life and
that of other species on the planet. Rising temperatures
and changing rainfall patterns are altering the most
basic and fundamental conditions for human, animal,
and plant life/survival. The International Energy
Agency (IEA, 2011) recently argued little time remains
for humankind to alter her behavior. If international-,
regional-, and national-level strategies do not change
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within the next 5 years, there is no chance the world
will keep step with the IPCC’s 450 Scenario aimed
at keeping temperature rise below +2 °C. And some
even argue the +2 °C target is inadequate (Hansen
et al., 2008; 350.org). Humanity, however, is currently
on a path to a +6 °C or greater rise in temperatures
(IEA, 2011). Even the 2010 concessions made at
COP15/CMP5 in Copenhagen are insufficient to keep
global warming below +3.5 °C (H€ohne et al., 2011).
Coupled with a recent report from the US Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Center announcing
that 2010 had witnessed the greatest annual increase
(5.9%) in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of all
time (Boden & Blasing, 2011), all of the points listed above
suggest humanity is moving in the wrong direction.
Good tools for the management of climate change
mitigation and adaptation, in particular those that are
natural, readily available, and comparatively inexpensive
to cultivate are hard to come by. Forests represent just
such a tool and exhibit distinct advantages over other
climate change mitigation and adaptation resources – in
particular due to their potential ‘double and triple use
value’. As forests naturally bind carbon dioxide into
biomass through photosynthesis, transpiration, and
growth, they are among the most important sources and
sinks of planetary greenhouse gases. Through deforesta-
tion, fellings, and natural decay, forests contribute
approximately 15–20% of the world’s GHG emissions.
Putting an end to deforestation and contributing to
re- and afforestation can contribute substantially to cli-
mate change mitigation. In addition, forests are linked
to natural processes of atmospheric regulation, partici-
pating importantly in the cross-continental transport of
moisture vapor and thus the more even distribution
and geographic diffusion of freshwater resources
(Ellison et al., 2012a). Further, forests cool the earth’s
surface and represent important biodiversity havens
(CBD, 2009; Ban-Weiss et al., 2011) – not to mention
their larger socioeconomic importance. Forests naturally
help preserve life in all its planetary forms and thus act
as an important climate change adaptation agent.
Despite clear and present justifications for the role of
forests in the climate change mitigation and adaptation
framework, insufficient progress has been made in cre-
ating an adequate support and incentive framework for
the successful mobilization of forest-based resources.
Current efforts to mobilize LULUCF for the purposes
of climate change mitigation and adaptation make
inadequate use of this remarkable resource. This is true
at two important levels. On one hand, large carbon pools
are not counted in current carbon accounting practices.
The potential mobilization of unmanaged forests, forest
management (FM) resources, HWP, and other omitted
carbon pools (peatlands, etc.) would greatly increase the
pool of potential resources for climate change mitigation
(and adaptation) strategies. Recent changes to LULUCF
introduced at the 2011 COP17 meetings in Durban only
partially modify this basic problem. Considerable
unevenness likewise remains across carbon accounting
and carbon-trading frameworks. This is perhaps most
obvious when considering the EU case in comparison to
the international UNFCCC framework. To date, the EU
still prohibits trade in emission reductions produced in
the LULUCF sector. Although, in the international
framework, countries do possess the right to trade in the
carbon sequestration potential of forest-based resources
– through Removal Units (RMU’s) and the CDM-based
Certified Emission Reductions (CER’s) – the potential
range for trading is constrained by the failure to ade-
quately incentivize all forms of forest-based carbon
sequestration (net removals).
In the current study, we measure and quantify the
magnitude of the current Incentive Gap (IG), both
across Annex I countries and also across the larger set
of non-Annex I and nonsignatory countries. In particu-
lar, we estimate the impact of the LULUCF changes
introduced in Durban on Commitment Period 2 (CP2)
and compare these with estimates of the IG in CP1.
Quite vast carbon mitigation resources go unmobilized
in the current carbon accounting and carbon-trading
frameworks. Yet relatively modest changes in the
UNFCCC and Kyoto carbon accounting guidelines and
procedures could potentially motivate and incentivize
significant change. However, we do not have a good
sense of: (1) what the potential magnitude of such car-
bon removals might be? (2) where the largest potential
pockets for additional carbon sequestration efforts lie?
(is it, for example, in unmanaged forests and omitted
carbon pools, in the Forest Management (FM, Art. 3.4)
sector, or other omitted carbon pools?); (3) what share
of potential increases in carbon sequestration lie in
Annex I countries and what share lies outside the
Annex I framework? and (4) what specific elements of
the UNFCCC and Kyoto carbon accounting procedures
in LULUCF should be changed to have the biggest
impact on increased carbon sequestration?
In what follows, we first address variation in carbon
accounting practices and their use in carbon-trading
frameworks at the international and EU level – focus-
ing in particular on the relative importance of Affores-
tation, Reforestation, and Deforestation (Art. 3.3 ARD)
relative to the complementary role of Forest Manage-
ment (Art. 3.4). Second, we discuss the potential role of
forests in climate change mitigation and adaptation,
highlighting in particular the elements of what we call
the ‘troika’ and the relative advantages associated with
balancing the competing sets of interests surrounding
forest resources. Third, we discuss the outcomes of the
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AWG-KP and the 2011 Durban LULUCF agreement.
Fourth, we compare old and new versions of the IG
based on the Durban outcome. Finally, we briefly out-
line the global potential that remains to be incentivized
in the KP framework. The final section concludes.
LULUCF carbon accounting and the Kyoto process
As illustrated in Ellison et al. (2011a), the efficient,
effective, and balanced use of forests and forest-based
resources can be implemented through an effective
reform of carbon accounting in LULUCF. To create
incentives for cost-efficient climate change mitigation
and adaptation and to promote the efficient and effec-
tive use of forest resources, it is necessary to include all
forest-based carbon pools and emissions in one all-
encompassing, unified, and coherent national land-use
inventory. Thus, all previously neglected carbon pools
should be combined into one national land-use inven-
tory, collapsing distinctions such as the inauspicious
division of LULUCF accounting into Art. 3.3 (Afforesta-
tion, Reforestation, and Deforestation, ARD) and Art.
3.4 (Forest Management, FM).
Further, adequate consideration of what we call the
troika of competing but potentially compatible interests
surrounding forest resources should address each of
the following: (1) the promotion of standing forests (in
particular for the purposes of carbon sequestration, bio-
diversity protection, and ecosystem promotion), (2) the
traditional HWP value chain, and (3) bioenergy. The
successful balancing of these competing interests and
the enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness in the
balanced use of forest resources require an accounting
mechanism that weighs and rewards each component
according to its real climate mitigation potential.
LULUCF carbon accounting models that favor the
interests of one member of the troika over others – in
particular bioenergy over standing forests and HWP –
will likely lead to inefficient outcomes.
Carbon sequestration in standing forests and HWP is
not fully recognized in most accounting frameworks.
The EU, for example, does not permit the inclusion of
LULUCF in EU-based commitments, and carbon credits
cannot be traded in the EU’s ETS. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of LULUCF accounting is uneven across Par-
ties to the KP. Although the recent conclusions of the
2011 COP17 meetings in Durban modified LULUCF
carbon accounting rules, the accounting of carbon
sequestration (net removals) in standing forests and
HWP has only been partially modified and remains
subject, in particular, to a new 3.5% of 1990 GHG emis-
sions ‘cap’. Although HWP and standing forests will
now be more highly valued than was previously the
case vis-a-vis bioenergy, eliminating the cap and incor-
porating all remaining omitted carbon pools can
improve this relationship. The successful inclusion of
all major terrestrial carbon pools in a revised and
updated Kyoto Protocol (KP) that fully accounts for all
carbon credits from both carbon sequestration (net
removals) and fossil fuel substitution, and renders
these fully fungible across international (and EU)
carbon-trading schemes, would encourage both long-
term carbon sequestration in standing forests, HWP,
and bioenergy resource use.
The international LULUCF carbon accounting framework
(UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol)
In its early efforts at promoting climate change mitiga-
tion, the UNFCCC placed considerable emphasis on
forests. Art. 4(1d) of the Convention addresses forestry
and states that Signatory parties shall ‘promote and
cooperate in the conservation and enhancement […] of
sinks’, including biomass and forests. Art. 4(1a) further
required the creation of national inventories and
regular reporting on ‘anthropogenic emissions and
removals by sinks’. Early national communications to the
UNFCCC addressed the extent of forest resources in
Signatory party countries and were followed by regular
reporting to the UNFCCC of GHG national inventories.
Through the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol framework,
countries possess the right to trade in Removal Units
(RMU’s) generated on the basis of Afforestation, Refores-
tation, and Deforestation (ARD, Art. 3.3) and forestry
operations, and in Certified Emission Reductions (CER’s)
generated on the basis of investments through the clean
development mechanism (CDM). RMU’s and CER’s, for
the most part, are restricted to carbon removals
generated under Art. 3.3 through Af- and Reforestation
efforts. Credits from carbon sequestration (net removals)
under FM (Ar. 3.4) are both limited by the so-called ‘cap’
(for Annex I countries) and are not eligible under the
framework of the CDM mechanism, which limits CER’s
to Afforestation and Reforestation efforts (Art. 12).
Due to this model, lands dedicated to forestry as of
the base year 1990 – whether currently forested or not
– are typically not eligible for credits resulting from
increased forest growth and carbon sequestration
efforts. Likewise, no credits can be calculated and
accounted for increased forest growth from unmanaged
forests. However, compared to the Art. 3.3 AR(D)
market, the Art. 3.4 FM market is significantly larger.
In this sense, the division of Art. 3.3 on Af-, Re-, and
Deforestation (ARD) from Art. 3.4 on FM in the UN-
FCCC and Kyoto Protocol guidelines is perhaps the
biggest single factor explaining the lack of adequate
integration of forestry-based interests in the RMU/CER
and Kyoto-based mechanisms.
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Although the CDM market initially exhibited little
positive growth, more recently it has become one of the
faster growing components of the semivoluntary
market. The CDM market represented 5.4% of the total
market in 2010 (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2011) com-
pared to approximately 1% of the total CDM market in
2008 (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2009: 51). RMU’s remain
the principal LULUCF-based mechanism, although
CER’s from CDM projects are on the rise.
The EU and the KP
Although the EU has repeatedly discussed the possibil-
ity of incorporating LULUCF into the EU climate
change mitigation framework, for the most part
LULUCF remains only a secondary appendage – suc-
cessful LULUCF carbon sequestration and emissions
are recorded in UNFCCC reporting, but generally not
accounted for in the EU framework. In revising the EU
strategy for the second Kyoto round intended to follow
upon the first Commitment Period (2008–2012), the
EU’s 2020 Climate and Energy package did not attempt
to model the impact of incorporating LULUCF in the
package (see SEC(2008)85-V2: 36-7) and ultimately left
LULUCF out of the policy framework. However, indi-
vidual elements of the Climate and Energy package did
require the European Commission to revisit that deci-
sion at a later date. Art.’s 8 and 9 of the EU’s Effort
Sharing Decision (406/2009/EC) and Art. 28 of the EU
ETS Directive (2009/29/EC) required that the European
Commission assess the possibility of incorporating LU-
LUCF into the EU emission reduction and emission
trading framework. The European Climate Change
Programme (ECCP) and DG Climate Action were
charged with the task of evaluating the potential role of
LULUCF and initiated several public consultations
(one in Fall 2010 and another in January 2011: see DG
CLIMA’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/
events_archives_en.htm).
There is considerable resistance within the EU
toward the integration of LULUCF into the EU’s cli-
mate change mitigation framework, and in particular
into the EU ETS. Both the EU ETS Directive (both the
previous EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) covering the
1st Commitment period and the newer ETS Directive
(2009/29/EC) covering the 2nd Commitment period)
and the EU Linking Directive (2004/101/EC), for exam-
ple, allow credits from CDM and JI projects to be used
in the EU ETS. But the Linking Directive explicitly
excludes the potential use of CER’s and ERU’s from the
LULUCF sector (Art. 11a, subparagraph 3b; see also
Swedish EPA, 2006: 11). There is, in particular, consid-
erable antipathy toward any weakening of the EU
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) that might result from
a possible reduction in carbon prices or reduced incen-
tives to limit emissions in the ETS sector.
Potential approaches for incorporating LULUCF in
the EU framework are essentially of two types. On one
hand, LULUCF could be integrated into the EU com-
mitment strategy and used as a tool for promoting
increased efforts at compensating emissions by promot-
ing the development of carbon sequestration strategies
through the use of forestry. On the other hand, the EU
could integrate LULUCF into the EU’s Emission Trad-
ing Scheme. However, despite generally widespread
support for the incorporation of LULUCF into the
EU climate policy framework, the ECCP (2010)
notes several difficulties. These include problems of
uncertainty in the estimates of sequestered carbon, the
lack of annually based LULUCF reporting cycles, and
uncertainty over whether LULUCF should be incorpo-
rated into the EU’s ETS or into the commitment mecha-
nism. The ECCP points out that incorporating LULUCF
into the EU ETS could require some manipulation, as
the EU ETS currently requires information about indi-
vidual installations (forest owners) and would require a
significant administrative apparatus. Furthermore, the
current EU ETS system is based on annual compliance,
whereas national forest inventories are based on longer
cycles (ECCP, 2010: 8).
Tensions between the competing uses of forest-based
resources are evident at the heart of the ECCP.
Whereas some participants would like to see a focus on
carbon sequestration in standing forests, others favor
the ‘use of biomass for substitution of GHG intensive
material and energy use’ (ECCP, 2010: 3). Some ECCP
members have even argued FM should not be included
when incorporating LULUCF into the EU climate strat-
egy – in particular due to the potential impact this
might have on HWP and the use of biomass for energy
(ECCP, 2010: 6).
In March 2012, DG Climate Action issued a draft
proposal on LULUCF GHG accounting rules that fol-
lows up on the Durban LULUCF agreement (COM
(2004) 93 final). For the most part, this proposal
addresses the harmonization of LULUCF accounting
rules across the EU member states. Furthermore, the
proposal intends to integrate and make mandatory
reporting on both the activities of Cropland and Graz-
ing land management in the general EU LULUCF
approach. However, although COM(2004) 94 final sets
the stage for future potential incorporation of LULUCF
into the EU climate policy framework, it stops short of
making explicit recommendations about how this
should be done. On the other hand, from discussions it
is clear that DG Climate Action is favoring a model that
isolates the potential impact of LULUCF on the EU cli-
mate policy framework by setting separate LULUCF
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targets and retaining the current segmentation between
LULUCF and the EU ETS system.
Individual Member states and Annex I signatories
likewise exhibit resistance to the potential for change.
Sweden, for example, like many EU member states and
Annex I countries, is resistant to modifications in the
existing rules that may result in higher levels of uncer-
tainty and risk. Incrementalism, i.e., taking only small
forward policy steps, is reinforced by the fact that deci-
sion making regarding Kyoto practices is conducted
through an intergovernmental framework requiring
consensus on the part of all participating Parties and
signatories. For this reason, large changes in the Kyoto
framework are difficult to pursue.
At the same time, several factors point to the poten-
tial importance of considering the model proposed
herein. First, the climate challenge requires urgent and
rapid action. Second, LULUCF represents a substan-
tially undermobilized resource with significant use
value. Third and finally, the current LULUCF carbon
accounting strategy has the unfortunate effect of favor-
ing the use of some forest-based resources over others.
In particular, bioenergy-based resources are currently
favored over other forest-based resources. Bioenergy is
strongly favored in current carbon accounting practices
– emissions from bioenergy combustion are considered
neutral whereas the carbon sequestered in HWP or in
standing forests is not consistently counted or incentiv-
ized. For carbon accounting purposes, during CP1, all
harvested wood is considered immediately oxidized.
Although this strategy has been favorably modified for
CP2, as we argue below, these changes do not go far
enough.
While this may encourage movement toward the low
carbon economy, we argue this can be achieved more
effectively and efficiently with improved carbon
accounting practices. Moreover the consequence of not
moving in this direction is the inefficient use of forest-
based resources and slower progress on climate change
mitigation (and adaptation). Finally, as we illustrate
below, this strategy does not adequately mobilize forest
growth and increases in the total forest sink.
Good tools for effective and efficient climate
change mitigation and adaptation?
Although potential strategies for efficient and effective
climate change mitigation exist, the structure of
approaches and the focus on efficient strategies remain
weakly articulated in the EU and most other countries.
Many organizations have pointed, for example, to the
potential advantage of pursuing increased energy effi-
ciency. The 3C Initiative in particular – a group of like-
minded think tanks – points to the high potential
return (economic reward) from investing in energy effi-
ciency in building-related energy use (for more on the
3C Initiative (2009), see: http://www.combatclimate-
change.org and the previous work of two affiliated
organizations, McKinsey, 2008; and Vattenfall, 2006).
The most distinctive feature of the 3C analysis is the
Table 1 Cost of forest-based carbon sequestration and renew-
able energy (cost per MtCO2e)
Ecosystems marketplace 2011
Reported
volume
(MtCO2e)
Avg. price
(US$/tCO2e)
Historical
total 2010 Historical 2010
Voluntary OTC 59 27.4 5.46 5.63
CCX 2.9 0.1 2.83 1.18
Total voluntary
markets
61.9 27.6 5.36 5.60
CDM 9 1.4 4.28 4.49
NSW GGAS 3.1 1.1 12.26 *
NZ ETS 0.6 0 13.91 12.95
Total regulated markets 12.8 2.6 5.61 4.61
Total global markets 74.7 30.1 5.40 5.54
Total primary market 71.6 29 5.22 5.49
Total secondary market 3.2 1.2 9.69 7.56
EU 2030 (IEA, 2009)
CO2 savings Abatement cost
MtCO2 $ per tonne CO2
Savings from lower
emitting technologies
660.0 54.20
More efficient coal
plant (excl. CCS)
23.5 9.90
More efficient gas
plant (excl. CCS)
– 0.00
Utilizing spare gas
capacity over coal
– 0.00
Through use of CCS 158.4 61.10
CCS coal (Oxyfuel) 77.0 56.90
CCS coal (IGCC) 66.4 61.10
CCS gas 15.0 83.10
Nuclear 252.6 39.60
Renewables 225.4 70.20
Hydro conventional 16.3 32.60
Bioenergy 39.7 58.60
Wind onshore 22.4 46.00
Wind Offshore 99.6 63.00
Geothermal 7.4 27.20
Solar PV 23.0 188.40
Concentrating solar
power
8.2 70.70
Tide/wave 8.8 61.50
Sources: Ecosystem Marketplace (2011: ii) and IEA (2009).
* Inadequate data.
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recognition of ‘negative abatement cost curves’ associ-
ated with energy efficiency improvements, indicating
substantial economic returns from investing in energy
efficiency. Although not strongly supported in the EU
climate policy framework, energy efficiency enjoys
support from important EU-level actors. The European
Climate Foundation (2010) recently published a report
detailing the need for more concerted energy efficiency
efforts, noting that the EU Member states would need to
triple their efforts to reach 2020 climate goals for reduc-
ing energy use by 20% (see also Altmann et al., 2010b).
Beyond energy efficiency, forest-based climate change
mitigation and adaptation scenarios represent a simi-
larly cost-efficient and effective strategy. Although both
are underutilized in the EU and global climate change
mitigation playbooks, we focus herein only on the
potential role of forests. There are many reasons for
promoting the role of forests in climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation. For one, forest-based carbon
sequestration represents one of the cheapest forms of
climate change mitigation. Compared in particular with
estimates of carbon dioxide (CO2) abatement costs
resulting from the introduction of renewable energy
technologies (Table 1, bottom panel), forest-based car-
bon sequestration is significantly less costly. Although
exceedingly difficult to estimate, at its most expensive,
the cost per ton of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e)
for carbon sequestered in forests is approximately $7.50
(or $12.95 in the New Zealand market) (Table 1, top
panel). And many forest-based carbon markets are sig-
nificantly cheaper. For renewable energy, on the other
hand, the lowest CO2 abatement cost estimates are for
efficient coal plants (not viable in the longer term).
Next to this, only geothermal energy is even remotely
competitive.
Much can be said about the relative accuracy of the
IEA cost estimates (see e.g., Altmann et al., 2010a: Sec.
4.2), or about the difficulties of accurately estimating
the costs of afforestation initiatives (ECCP, 2008). More-
over, estimated costs can easily change based on the
structure of demand or change in the underlying tech-
nologies. The IPCC Forest report (Nabuurs et al., 2007)
estimates the amount of carbon sequestration that
would occur at different price levels and assumes base
prices for carbon sequestration that are considerably
higher than those presented here. This may in part be a
function of variation in price levels across countries
and regions. The cost estimates provided in the Ecosys-
tem Marketplace (2011) report also have the advantage
of being based on more recent experience. All in all,
however, forests represent a significant advantage over
many other climate change mitigation alternatives. In
pointing this out, we do not wish to suggest efforts
should not be made to pursue the use of renewable
energy technologies. We do, however, wish to suggest
there are multiple and explicit advantages from pursu-
ing increased forest growth and forest-based carbon
sequestration. These can accommodate and comple-
ment the advantages of renewable energy technologies.
The potential for carbon sequestration in forests and
soils is considerable. Forests already represent vast
stores of carbon. All in all, this amount totals some
861  66 Pg C, with just under half of this amount
(383  30 Pg C, 44%) located in the soil and the
remaining amount represented by living biomass
(42%), deadwood (8%), and litter (5%) (Pan et al., 2011:
989). How much more carbon forests could potentially
sequester on an annual basis remains open to question.
Pan et al. (2011) note that estimates of the current global
annual net uptake of forests range from less than 1.0 to
as much as 3.4 Pg C yr1, but provide considerably
lower personal estimates at 1.1  0.8 Pg C yr1. The
IPCC 2007 Forest report likewise notes considerable var-
iation in the estimates of the total global mitigation
potential of standing forests. Based on variation in the
international price of carbon, potential estimates range
anywhere from 1.3 to 13.8 GtCO2e yr
1 (Nabuurs et al.,
2007: 543). Although significantly underutilized and not
effectively mobilized, forest-based carbon sequestration
represents a significant global potential.
Accounting procedures that potentially contribute to
slowing the rate of deforestation and forest cover loss
represent significant global public goods and can poten-
tially be influential in both less developed, developing,
and developed countries. Deforestation represents one of
the greatest potential threats to future global atmo-
spheric GHG concentrations. On the other hand, total
global forest density has increased, largely compensat-
ing many of the regions with declining forest cover
(Rautiainen et al., 2011). Although the precise impact of
deforestation on global emissions remains contested
(Van der Werf et al., 2009), total emissions from defores-
tation, forest degradation, and peatlands represent 15%
or more of global anthropogenic emissions. Previous
estimates were considerably higher, reaching as much
as 20% of global GHG emissions. Van der Werf et al.
(2009) also include new emission sources in their calcu-
lations (in particular peatlands). For a large number of
developing countries, deforestation and forest degrada-
tion represent the principal source of emissions (ibid.).
These points provide strong arguments for support-
ing the promotion of forests as a climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation tool. Virtually any mechanism that
can successfully slow or put a stop to current rates of
deforestation would have a sizable and significant
impact on current rates of global warming and climate
change. The fact that forests provide a relatively cheap
resource for achieving this goal represents a win-win
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opportunity. The advantages of promoting increased
forest growth and cover can simultaneously help pro-
mote avoided or reduced deforestation.
But beyond questions of cost, forests and forest-based
resources exhibit many other advantages. As argued
below, forests have what one might call a ‘double and/or
triple use value’: forest-based resources can serve more
than one purpose, can be used more than once and can
likewise be used simultaneously to fulfill multiple goals
at any given point in time (i.e., for climate change
mitigation and adaptation). In this sense, forests and for-
est-based resources have distinct advantages over other
climate change mitigation and adaptation tools and can
potentially give rise to multiplier-type effects due to their
use and reuse. The multiplier use value of forests is not
adequately appreciated in the current literature.
Few would dispute that a more diversified use of for-
est-based resources based on the promotion of standing
forests and HWP is less efficient. Following Nabuurs
et al. (2008), quite a diverse range of potential forest
uses can be mobilized to ‘maintain or maximize forest
carbon pools and carbon sequestration’. Without enter-
ing into the details of this debate, carbon accounting
strategies that provide a framework for supporting mul-
tiple forest uses represent a meaningful alternative. To
encourage a more efficient and balanced use of forest
resources, a more flexible and dynamic carbon account-
ing framework is presumably a requirement. But the
potential advantages of forest-based resources extend
well beyond their more conventional multifunctional use
value to include a substantial range of climate change
mitigation and adaptation use values.
Forests and forest-based biomass material have double
and sometimes triple the potential use value associated with
other climate change mitigation and adaptation
resources and tools. Thus, on one hand, in addition to
representing invaluable long-term stores of carbon and
thus a particularly inexpensive climate change mitiga-
tion resource, forests likewise have considerable climate
change adaptation value. For example, forests play an
invaluable and even crucial role in natural atmospheric
regulation of the hydrologic cycle (Ellison et al., 2012a).
Forests likewise play an important role in cooling the
Earth’s surface (Ban-Weiss et al., 2011). And forests
have the potential to play an important role in biodi-
versity protection. However, many of the climate
change mitigation and adaptation related advantages of
standing forests (and even forestry) are frequently not
well recognized (Ellison, 2010).
Mitigating the troika
The concept of the efficient and effective use of forest-
based resources is simultaneously based on the potential
uses of biomass resources. However, in addition to the
traditional forest resource-based value chain, bioenergy
now consumes ever-larger amounts of the forest
resource value chain.
To date, a large part, about 50%, of the roundwood
taken out of the forests globally is used as fuel wood
(FAO, 2010). The corresponding number for Sweden is
about 8%. But of the remaining industrial roundwood
about 35% is eventually combusted for energy produc-
tion as waste products from the refinement chain at
saw and paper mills (Wikberg, 2009). Residual waste
(branches, treetops, and increasingly frequently
stumps) is also utilized for bioenergy production. This
pattern, however, is not representative of all countries.
In Hungary, for example, much of bioenergy demand
is met with solid biomass (logs chipped for combus-
tion). But even in countries like Sweden, discussions
increasingly revolve around what share of treetops
should be set aside for bioenergy material and how
much should be used for stemwood (HWP). Increasing
demand for bioenergy material is likely to place
increasing pressure on potential uses for harvested
biomass material.
The point we have tried to make (Ellison et al.,
2011a) and emphasize here again is that current cli-
mate-related strategies, in particular because of the
emphasis they place on bioenergy use and their failure
to incorporate adequate accounting of HWP and
standing forests, are likely to place significant pres-
sures on the traditional forest value chain. We do not
wish to signal lack of support for the use of forest-
based resources for bioenergy purposes. This would
significantly misinterpret our goal. Rather, we argue
that far more could (and presumably should) be done
to ensure the following two key points: (1) that the
pursuit of and support for bioenergy use does not
undermine other viable and efficient uses of forest-
based resources (the traditional forest value chain
should not come under threat from new entrants
favored by climate change mitigation), and (2) that
a truly efficient and effective use of forest-based
resources should be pursued. From our perspective
creating a level playing field based on equal incentives
for all components of the forest value chain will pro-
mote the full potential use value of forest-based
resources, thereby taking advantage of their double/
triple use value.
Without adequate safeguards in place, one of the
important risks is that much of the traditional value
chain (in particular HWP) will be threatened by the
growth of the bioenergy sector. Although powerful
incentives for fossil fuel substitution may have impor-
tant emission reducing effects, they also have poten-
tially far-reaching and unintended consequences for
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standing forests (see in particular Wise et al. 2009), as
well as for more conventional forest-based industries.
In the EU, the growth of bioenergy use for the
production of heat and electricity has been significant
(see Table 2). In the EU as a whole, bioenergy use has
grown at a rate of 88% over the period from 1990 to
2009 (at 174% in the New member states (NMS) and at
68% in the EU15). EU and national-level goals for
biomass energy use are significantly high. This is dri-
ven primarily by the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive
(2009/28/EC) and by expectations that a significant
share of EU renewable energy will be generated using
national-level bioenergy resources.
The 2010 EU Wood report notes that demand for
biomass for energy use is likely to outstrip available
supply sometime between 2015 and 2020 (Mantau et al.,
2010: 23), creating the conditions for significant conflict
across the different components of the forest value
chain. Improved FM could ameliorate at least some of
these constraints (Verkerk et al., 2011). At the same
time, econometric projections of future forest use sug-
gest that the bioenergy sector will place increasing
strain on the European forest sink (B€ottcher et al.,
2012). These studies, however, inexplicably neglect the
potential for increased forest cover and growth outside
FM. Although Art. 3.3 afforestation and reforestation is
not immediately available for use in the bioenergy sec-
tor, it can help mitigate losses to the forest sink.
At a larger scale, such pressures are not yet evident.
Based on data reported by Parties to the UNFCCC
(Submission 2011, 7th of November), CO2 emissions
from biomass use have risen significantly. In the
EU15, emissions have increased 104%, in the
EU27 124%, and in the New member states 260%. For
Table 2 Change in renewable and bioenergy use, 2009/1990
Country/Region
Change in RES use,
exclud. hydro
(GIC 2009/1990), %
Wood and wood
waste share of RES
(GIC 2009), %
FM forest cover
share of total
land use, %
Change in
wood and
wood waste use
(PEP 2009/1990), %
Change in wood
and wood waste use
(GIC 2009/1990), %
EU27 133 45 24 85 88
EU15 126 41 23 62 68
NMS10 185 76 27 192 174
Austria 79 46 3 0 83
Belgium 386 56 1 139 290
Bulgaria 231 67 3 340 329
Cyprus 1533 16 (na) 50 167
CzR 171 73 34 143 123
Denmark 237 52 14 90 164
Estonia 290 95 4 348 270
Finland 44 81 72 50 42
France 35 48 41 0 0
Germany 493 36 32 281 281
Greece 89 38 9 11 11
Hungary 152 77 20 117 128
Ireland 433 21 4 70 79
Italy 157 22 31 310 376
Latvia 50 80 54 156 91
Lithuania 178 86 34 189 167
Luxembourg 611 27 3 127 127
Malta 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 377 35 2 189 259
Poland 302 82 30 258 258
Portugal 65 52 45 13 13
Romania 233 71 28 538 522
Slovakia 270 51 1 290 273
Slovenia 70% 48 59 81 61
Spain 156 27 27 9 9
Sweden 39 54 72 67 67
UK 581 24 7 331 447
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat online data. GIC, Gross inland consumption; PEP, Primary Energy Production
(Ellison, 2011b).
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Annex I countries, however, while CO2 emissions from
biomass have increased, fossil fuel-based CO2 emis-
sions have declined. At the same time, biomass CO2
emissions as a share of forestland CO2 emissions have
decreased, whereas carbon removals in forestry have
increased. Thus while the shift to biomass has contrib-
uted to reducing global fossil fuel-based emissions,
thus far forest cover has not been negatively impacted.
Worldwide, biomass emissions have risen some 37%.
However, total biomass emissions for all Annex I
countries are heavily influenced by the decline from
above 60 000 Gg CO2 to about 14 000 Gg CO2 in Rus-
sia. This suggests that the potential to use biomass
from the forest for energy generation is large and can
be increased without jeopardizing the net sink.
At the country level, some parties have increased the
use of biomass and some have decreased it. The largest
increase can be seen among eastern European countries
(i.e., Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria), whereas the
decrease was found in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
and Croatia. On average the increase in biomass use
did not affect net removals on forestland. However, at
country level, several parties increasing the use of bio-
mass have also decreased net removals on forestland.
And in some countries, National Forest Inventory dis-
crepancies have emerged (Ellison et al., 2012b).
Beyond the threat to biomass availability and the tra-
ditional forest value chain, far more is really at stake.
The double and triple use value of both the climate
change mitigation and adaptation potential of forests is
best promoted by a strategy that: (1) does not place the
most emphasis only on bioenergy, and provides
greater opportunities for the promotion of both stand-
ing forests and HWP; and (2) places a particular
emphasis on the margin for increased forest growth
and cover.
AWG-KP negotiations and the 2011 COP17 Durban
outcome
Since 2008, the AWG-KP (the Ad hoc Working Group
on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the
Kyoto Protocol) has conducted discussions on how to
revise carbon accounting rules for LULUCF. Several
options to replace the current rules were proposed. For
the most part, these concerned carbon accounting
under FM (Art. 3.4 of the KP) – in particular strategies
for replacing the gross-net accounting approach and
the ‘cap’ with an alternative rule – and whether FM
should be mandatory. Up to Durban, the fallback posi-
tion was to keep the rules as they are.
Several important decisions were made at the 2011
COP17 Durban meetings regarding LULUCF account-
ing practices (see, the advance unedited Durban LU-
LUCF conclusions are available here: http://unfccc.int/
files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/
pdf/awgkp_lulucf.pdf). The first of these involves the
decision to continue the Kyoto Protocol and to enter a
second Commitment Period in 2013 that will end either
in 2017 or 2020. The second concerns the transition to
mandatory reporting under FM. The third involves the
adoption of a new, revised ‘cap’ and the shift to ‘net-
net’ accounting. The new ‘cap’, set at 3.5% of total 1990
GHG emissions (excl. LULUCF), is larger than the pre-
vious cap. Furthermore, the shift to net-net accounting
means that annual growth will not be counted against
zero (‘gross-net’ accounting), but will rather be counted
against a specific, predetermined baseline (or ‘reference
level’). Parties may gain credits if they report removals
about the baseline up to the new cap. Any FM-based
removals above the 3.5% cap remain unaccounted and
non-incentivized. Parties will be debited if reported
removals (increased harvest) fall below the baseline.
Table 3 Kyoto LULUCF rules: pre- and post-Durban
Kyoto rules – LULUCF Pre-Durban (CP-I: 2008–2012) Post-Durban (CP-II: 2013–2020) Idealized model
FM election Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory
Cap 3% of 1990 emissions,
15% of actual net removals
(whichever smaller, or negotiated)
3.5% 1990 emissions No cap
Reference level/
(Accounting method)
Reference level = ‘0’ (gross-net) Projected, historical or
reference level = ‘0’ (net-net)
Reference level = ‘0’ (gross-net)
HWP Reported/not counted Production approach
(limited by ‘cap’)
Production approach
(or stock change Approach, no limit)
IG 88% 43–66% 0%
ARD offsetting Permitted Not permitted Collapse Arts. 3.3 & 3.4
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The fourth new decision concerns mandatory report-
ing of HWP. Parties are now required to report HWP,
and can register credits for HWP using the Production
Approach (PA) as long as ‘transparent and verifiable
activity data’ are available. Barring this, HWP may be
reported on the basis of instant oxidation. However, as
all Annex I countries have FAO data available to them,
HWP reporting will now be conducted on the basis of
the PA. This approach does not permit the accounting
of imported, harvested wood products. Finally,
although HWP can now be accounted, countries are
still subject to the terms of the new 3.5% ‘cap’. Thus, in
this regard, carbon sequestration (net removals)
through HWP is only partially incentivized. In fact, for
most Annex I countries, this amount is likely to be
minimal.
Other LULUCF changes agreed in Durban include
the incorporation of at least one previously omitted car-
bon pool: Wetland drainage and rewetting has now
been added to the category of electable activities. A
new natural disturbances mechanism has been approved
that allows Parties to withdraw from accounting emis-
sions from land areas associated with natural distur-
bances when they exceed a set background level. The
background level is set based on historical information
on disturbances. Finally, a new mechanism has been
introduced under Art. 3.4 that allows countries to trade
new afforestation against deforestation.
Current LULUCF negotiations have not typically
included some or even most of the recommendations
raised in this study. No attempts, for example, are
currently being made to collapse Arts. 3.3 and 3.4, or to
include all omitted carbon pools into one all-inclusive
carbon accounting framework. To date, Art. 3.3 activi-
ties have remained untouched and the focus is primar-
ily on how to account for increases or decreases in net
removals in Forest management under Art. 3.4. Like-
wise, although it has been suggested, few countries
favor entirely removing the cap and moving to a gross-
net accounting system without limitations on the total
potential accounting of carbon sequestration (net remo-
vals) under FM.
Table 3 summarizes the most important pre- and
post-Durban decisions and also provides an indication
in column 3 of what we consider the ideal LULUCF
carbon accounting framework. In this context, although
Durban in many ways represents an important step
forward – perhaps the two most important accom-
plishments from our perspective are mandatory report-
ing under FM and the sizeable increase in the cap that
will be applied in CP2 – we generally argue much
more can be done to adequately ‘incentivize’ the bal-
anced and efficient use of forests and forest-based
resources.
ARD, FM, and other omitted carbon pools
Art. 3.3 on Afforestation, Reforestation, and Deforesta-
tion (ARD) was essentially created to promote human-
induced change in forest cover and growth. This pro-
vided a framework for promoting the climate change
mitigation and adaptation potential of forests. How-
ever, the decision to exclude what is presumably the
largest share of human-induced forest resources from
comprehensive carbon accounting practices and thus
incentivized carbon sequestration may remain one of
the greatest riddles of UNFCCC and KP history. By
placing an emphasis on anthropogenic or human-
induced forms of change in forest growth and thus for-
est-related carbon sequestration, Art. 3.3 essentially
excluded both natural forest growth and forest manage-
ment from accounting. Art. 3.4 (FM) was created as an
afterthought, primarily at the insistence of Japan (Fry,
2002). Whether intentional or not, this afterthought sep-
arated forest-managed lands from lands set aside for
afforestation.
Many were initially concerned about the potential
impact of including LULUCF in the Kyoto framework
as it was assumed that many countries with large forest
cover might take advantage of it to reduce efforts on
their Kyoto Protocol emission reduction commitments.
Although this concern persists (see e.g., H€ohne et al.,
2011: 7), we argue that this problem can be addressed
by improving the structure of commitments (Ellison
et al., 2011a). The setting of commitments should follow
upon the setting of rules (not the reverse). In this way,
the emission reducing potential of forests can be
included in country- and international-level target set-
ting. Furthermore, concerns about the role of ‘natural
disturbances’ have likewise contributed to limitations of
the potential role FM can play in carbon removals. Both
of these concerns have led to the development of car-
bon accounting practices that significantly limit the
potential to mobilize carbon sequestration (net remo-
vals) in forest-based resources.
Thus the split between Arts. 3.3 and 3.4 activities had
the impact of artificially hiving off the vast majority of
human-induced change in forest cover and growth (Art.
3.4) from the category of af-, re-, and deforestation (Art.
3.3). As Art. 3.3 AR was mandatory for all Parties
under the KP, many Parties did not feel the need to
elect FM. Moreover, for some countries, the option to
voluntarily elect and thus report ‘forest management’
activities represented an almost unavoidable incentive
to promote within-country leakage across Arts. 3.3 and
3.4 and, under CP1, may still encourage forest degrada-
tion in Annex I countries and deforestation in Non-
Annex I countries where sustainable forest manage-
ment (SFM) practices are not well entrenched. For other
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countries, not electing FM represented a strategy for
shielding the forestry sector from any potential nega-
tive impacts that might arise from stricter carbon
accounting.
Although AR was intended to form the principal
contribution to carbon sequestration in the LULUCF
sector, in practice the opposite has happened. Figure 1
displays the share of AR in relation to the total
accounted forestland net removals as reported under
the UNFCCC. Although several countries in Europe
have seen quite significant increases in forest cover, the
average contribution from AR represents only approxi-
mately 16% of the total across Annex I countries. More-
over, a good share of total carbon sequestration (net
removals) under Art. 3.3 is actually the result of offsets
from FM (16%). The vast majority of carbon sequestra-
tion (net removals) that could hypothetically be
recorded if all Annex I countries were eligible to claim
them originates from the FM sector (offsets + cap), or
approximately 84% (16% + 68%).
In fact, despite significant efforts in Annex I countries
to pursue af- and reforestation projects, in total this
amount has not been enough to completely compensate
Annex I countries for the rate of deforestation. Esti-
mated across all Annex I countries, total ARD in 2008–
2009 results in a net emission of 30 MtCO2 yr
1. As
indicated in Fig. 1, net emissions are compensated by
offsets from the forestry sector. However, even with the
potential for using offsets from FM, a few countries still
exhibit net emissions.
Thus for Annex I countries, the share of increased
carbon sequestration (net removals) under the Forest
Management cap represents the most important con-
tribution to LULUCF-based carbon sequestration.
This suggests reliance on Art. 3.3 ARD activities may
be misplaced. The total increase in forest cover and
growth is significantly greater under FM than under
Art. 3.3. Moreover, the share of total annual active for-
est regeneration under FM exceeds that under Art. 3.3
by a significant factor. In Sweden, for example, aver-
aged over the period 1990–2010, on an annual basis
more than 13 times more active forest regeneration
occured under FM than under Art. 3.3 (based on data
from the Swedish Forestry Agency 2011; ‘artificial
regeneration’ is ‘planting and ground sowing’ and
excludes natural regeneration). This should not suggest
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Fig. 1 Accounted: AR(D) net removals + AR(D) offsets from FM + FM net removals up to the cap (in% of total). Note: For the
purposes of this illustration, any emissions under AR(D) are set to ‘0’. We have also estimated hypothetical offsets and removals for
countries that have not elected FM under CP1. Furthermore, all nonaccounted FM net removals measured in the Incentive Gap are
not included here. Sources: Based on 2011 Annex I Party GHG Inventory Submissions under the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/natio
nal_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/5888.php). Average values for the years 2008 and
2009. For parties not electing FM, data on Forest land remaining forest land reported to the UNFCCC has been used as a proxy.
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there is no potential outside the FM sector. Quite the
opposite is presumably true. But to date, most of the
increased forest cover and growth has occurred under
FM, underlining that attempts to mobilize forest-based
resources should not neglect this sector.
In this regard, as argued in Ellison et al. (2011a),
merging re-, afforestation, and carbon sequestration
efforts into one cohesive framework may make good
sense. The principal foundation for this argument is the
lack of solid theoretical grounding for the division
between these two categories: as they are both power-
fully linked to anthropogenic manipulation, concepts of
human-induced vs. natural growth do not logically
support their separation. To this argument, we add that
a greater share of increased forest cover and growth in
Annex I countries comes from FM.
The 2011 COP17 meetings in Durban eliminated the
offset rule (transfer of net removals from FM to ARD).
Thus in CP2, countries will no longer be able to com-
pensate net emissions and/or harvesting from ARD
with removals under FM. This has the interesting effect
that countries will no longer be able to arbitrarily
increase the use of the total amount of FM removals by
utilizing these to cover deforestation in Art. 3.3 sectors.
Moreover, this raises the relative importance of the Art.
3.3 ARD segment, as countries will now effectively be
penalized for all deforestation in this segment and are
further eligible for any and all credits (without limit)
arising from increased reafforestation.
On the other hand, if the cap is eventually removed
(as we recommend), this would essentially mean there
is no longer any significant difference, in terms of
potential carbon credits, between Art. 3.3 and 3.4. Both
under CP1 and CP2 rules, there has always been an
incentive to increase reafforestation under Art. 3.3
because no cap to the total amount of carbon credits
individual countries can receive has been imposed.
However, as illustrated above, this has not provided
significant incentives for additional carbon sequestra-
tion efforts.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of eliminat-
ing the cap and collapsing Arts. 3.3 and 3.4, however,
is the potential to mobilize the entire forest sink rather
than only part of it. This, along with the inclusion of
other currently omitted carbon pools (such as unman-
aged forests) could possibly go a long way to ensuring
that adequate forest biomass will be available to meet
rising demand and adequate forest cover will be avail-
able to secure additional benefits from forest-based
climate change mitigation and adaptation.
One area where our model may create unintended
incentives should, however, be highlighted. Although
FM can have potentially significant and positive
impacts on all of the above-mentioned climate change
mitigation and adaptation issues, FM can have negative
impacts as well. In particular, concerns raised by mono-
cultures, plantation forestry and, negative impacts on
both the water supply and biodiversity, and some of
Fig. 2 HWP and Global Carbon Pool Flows. Source: Own calculations based on IPCC HWP guidelines and using Kim Pingoud’s
EXPHWP model (version 4.3). The excel spreadsheet model is available at: http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/
4_Volume4/V4_12_Ch12_HWP_Worksheet.zip. Data are from the FAO: http://faostat.fao.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageI-
D=626&lang= en#ancor. Inflows were based on the annual global production of semi-finished products in the categories sawn wood,
wood-based panels, and paper products. Outflows for each category (the world’s total amount of discarded products per year)
represent first-order estimations using half-life values, 35 years for sawn wood, 25 years for wood-based panels, and 2 years for
paper.
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the potentially negative impacts of forestry operations
on the environment should not go unrecognized.
At the same time, there are potential ways to handle
such difficulties. Where there are challenges to biodi-
versity from FM, one can consider a strategy that
weighs the relative value of untouched/pristine and/or
natural forest cover more highly than FM forest cover.
This could, for example, be calculated on the basis of
RMU’s at a slightly higher marginal rate than for other
forms of carbon sequestration. Although the impact
pushes in the opposite direction, this proposed strategy
is not unlike the form of ‘discounting’ that already
occurs with estimating carbon sequestration in HWP:
lost shares of carbon sequestration from harvesting,
decomposition, etc., are deducted from contributions to
the carbon pool.
HWP
Although HWP has long contributed to a growing
carbon pool, its potential has not been adequately
mobilized. Under CP1 rules, harvested biomass is con-
sidered as immediately oxidized. After Durban, under
CP2 rules, a greater share of HWP can be accounted.
However, several important restrictions apply. Thus we
argue that HWP still has not been adequately mobi-
lized and more could be done.
Figure 2 illustrates global inflows entering the HWP
carbon pool and outflows leaving the pool. The differ-
ence (inflows–outflows) corresponds to the net change
in the HWP carbon pool. Inflows are higher than
outflows, thus raising the total size of the carbon pool
in the long term.
The total net HWP carbon pool was calculated at
approximately 19 270 TgCO2 in 2010. Between 1990
and 2010, this pool increased by approximately 34%.
Thus, HWP continues to sequester a considerable
amount of carbon. The net annual mitigation potential
from the carbon pool was equal to about 241 TgCO2
(1236–1994) in 2010. Furthermore, this quantity will
increase on an annual basis as long as HWP use contin-
ues to increase and longer term HWP impacts on the
carbon pool are favored.
To gain some sense of the magnitudes involved, a
country like Sweden emitted 60 TgCO2 in 2010. Assum-
ing 100% of outflows from the carbon pool are used as
bioenergy for fossil fuel substitution, the total annual
mitigation potential (TAMP), i.e., the global amount of
carbon either sequestered in HWP or made available
for fossil fuel substitution through bioenergy combus-
tion (outflows from the pool), represented an amount
some 17.5 times (241 + 807/60) Sweden’s annual GHG
emissions. Moreover, this amount does not include fos-
sil fuel substitution resulting from choosing HWP prod-
ucts over high carbon intensity construction materials
like cement and steel.
To gain a sense of the potential HWP magnitudes
made available for carbon sequestration on an annual
basis, the annual harvest in Sweden (after accounting
for initial decomposition and other losses during
harvest) represents approximately 59 TgCO2 in total
Roundwood outtake. Currently, this amount is roughly
equivalent to total annual GHG emissions in Sweden.
However, although some CO2 is emitted during
processing, the total amount made available for carbon
sequestration is still significant. This reveals the impor-
tance of carbon accounting strategies that recognize the
total amount of carbon sequestered in HWP. Not count-
ing this quantity will reduce incentives for taking
advantage of the HWP carbon pool.
It is difficult to estimate potential change in the pro-
duction of HWP and thus future potential amounts of
carbon sequestration and fossil fuel substitution that
might occur as a result of adequate carbon accounting
practices and improved incentives. Although some
attempts have been made to estimate future demand
for HWP and bioenergy, these are typically based on
existing demand structures and do not incorporate
modified incentives. Nor do we necessarily know how
these incentives might get translated into practice at the
national level.
The above data suggest HWP represents a potentially
important climate change mitigation resource. More-
over, the data above support the concept of double and
triple use value: without HWP, TAMP is reduced by
the annual net gain to the carbon pool (241 TgCO2).
On the surface, the changes in the Durban COP17
LULUCF agreement appear to recognize this potential.
The requirement of reporting HWP based on the Pro-
duction Approach will make it possible for countries to
further mobilize the carbon sequestered in HWP.
At the same time, the new Durban regulations also
impose important constraints. The new 3.5% cap will
also be applied to potential HWP carbon credits as
well. Thus, although the new regulation could poten-
tially provide more powerful incentives for carbon
sequestration in HWP, these incentives will be
restricted by the 3.5% cap limit. Likewise, the introduc-
tion of a reference line and the loss of the potential to
gain carbon credits below it mean not all contributions
to FM removals are weighted according to their true
global warming potential.
The incentive gap: the impact of old and new
measures
In what follows, we assess the magnitude of the IG
across different sets of assumptions. For the purposes
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of continuity, we continue to define the IG as a func-
tion of the ‘share of carbon sequestration (net removals)
not incentivized in the regulatory framework’. How-
ever, we indulge in several versions of this definition:
considering in turn only nonaccounted FM carbon
sequestration (net removals), the inclusion of HWP car-
bon accounting and other carbon pools, the inclusion of
Non-Annex I and other countries, and the incorpora-
tion of unmanaged forests in the Post-Kyoto frame-
work. We focus particular attention on the impact of
change across the first and second commitment periods
(CP1 and CP2) and the impact of the Durban 2011
COP17 changes to LULUCF accounting practices. With
this approach we would like to demonstrate the rela-
tive magnitude of missed opportunities in the current
Kyoto framework and possibly also future Post-Kyoto
frameworks.
Ellison et al. (2011a) estimate the IG under FM for
Annex I countries at approximately 75%. This estimate,
however, was based on the projections of individual
countries about what total forest carbon sequestration
(net removals) would be after harvest. In this version of
the IG, we focus instead on the actual carbon sequestra-
tion experience of Annex I countries over the first 2 years
of Commitment Period 1 (2008–2009), as well as projec-
tions of FM removals for CP2 (2013–2020). Thus in this
version of the IG, we compare the total amount of carbon
sequestration (net removals) eligible for carbon credits
under the Kyoto carbon accounting framework with that
amount of carbon sequestration that is not accounted.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, Parties remain at very differ-
ent stages of integration in the Kyoto Process. Thus,
although all of the countries are signatories, one of
them has failed to ratify it (United States) and three
additional countries have either announced their inten-
tion to leave the KP (Canada) or have already left
(Japan and the Russian Federation). More recently,
Japan has shown signs of changing its mind and reen-
tering CP2. However, no formal decision has been
made at this writing. In addition to the failure of these
countries to remain committed to the Kyoto goals, other
countries demonstrate varying degrees of commitment
to many of the features of the LULUCF portion of this
agreement. Thus, a significantly large set of countries
chose not to ‘elect’ FM in CP1, and some of these coun-
tries have also failed to negotiate an FM ‘cap’.
For the purposes of the following analysis, we make
a number of important assumptions. First, for countries
that have chosen not to elect FM (this includes all coun-
tries that have not chosen a ‘cap’), we assume an IG
equal to 100% for CP1. Although these countries may
have sizable FM sectors (e.g., the United States), choos-
ing not to elect FM essentially means these countries are
not subject to the same reporting requirements and are
also not eligible for carbon credits under FM (nor can
they be debited for increased harvesting, should this
FM Not Elected:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus*, 
Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Slovakia and the US
No cap:
Belarus, Kazakhstan*, Malta 
and Turkey**
KP not ratified:
US
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom
Dropouts:
Japan, Russian 
Federation
Canada
Fig. 3 Kyoto Protocol Annex I Signatories. Source: Various CP/CMP decisions, www.unfccc.int. On 8 June 2011, Canada indicated
that it does not intend to participate in a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. In a communication dated 10 December 2010, Japan
indicated that it does not have any intention to be under obligation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. In a com-
munication dated 8 December 2010 that was received by the secretariat on 9 December 2010, the Russian Federation indicated that it does not
intend to assume a quantitative emission limitation or reduction commitment for the second commitment period. * Neither country is a Party to
CP1. However, after the adoption of a cap (Kazakhstan), both Cyprus and Kazakhstan intend to participate in CP2. ** Turkey has stated its
intention to participate in CP2, but has not formally submitted a projection line and was not included in the Durban data tables.
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surpass annual growth rates). As countries are able to
‘elect’ or ‘not elect’ FM under the pre-Durban KP
system, the size of the IG is larger than it would have
been under mandatory reporting. For example,
although Austria had a cap that permitted the account-
ing of up to 2.31 million tons CO2 of carbon removals
per year under FM, the decision not to elect FM meant
this share of carbon sequestration could not be counted
and thus was not ‘incentivized’. As a result of Durban,
under CP2, FM reporting has become mandatory. Thus,
although some countries exhibited a tendency to shield
their forest resource from accounting, this option has
now been foreclosed.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, based on pre-Durban rules,
the IG across CP1 and CP2 is quite large. Weighted
across all Annex I countries and based on estimated
forest growth and fellings, the IG is 89% in CP1 and
85% in CP2. The area above the columns represents
the share of net forest removals that can be accounted
under the cap. Averaged across individual countries,
the IG was larger: 88% in CP1 and 80% in CP2. The
increased size of the IG for CP1 in this analysis (Elli-
son et al., 2011a found an IG of 75%) was mostly due
to the assumption regarding FM nonelection. Without
this assumption, the IG was approximately the same
(76%). In addition, much of the change in the IG
between CP1 and CP2 under the old rules is the
result of changes in the projection of the total harvest
under CP2. The size of the IG is likewise strongly
impacted by the total projected harvest. Where the
projected harvest is large, the relative size of the IG
diminishes and vice versa. As many Parties project big-
ger harvests in the 2nd CP due to increased demand,
the age structure of the forest, etc., this is the
principal explanation of the reduced IG in that
period.
The 2011 COP17 conclusions from Durban introduce
a new revised cap that will become effective in CP2.
Generally speaking, the impact of the new cap is to
raise the total amount of potential accounted carbon
removals under FM that can be claimed by individual
countries and thus reduce the IG. However, the impact
of the new cap varies considerably across individual
countries and Annex I as a whole. For individual coun-
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
CP1
CP2
cap
IG
Country-by-Country Average
CP1 88%
CP2 80%
Weighted Average
CP1 89%
CP2 85%
Fig. 4 Incentive Gap based on CP1 rules (cap/FM net removals). CP1 represents the current cap relative to 2008–2009 FM net remo-
vals. CP2 represents the current cap relative to 2013–2020 FM net removals based on submitted FMRL or other projections. For Par-
ties not electing FM and/or without a negotiated ‘cap’, IG = 100%. The ‘average’ is the average of individual IG’s. The weighted
average is the total mobilized cap relative to total FM net removals. Sources: Based on 2011 Annex I Party GHG Inventory Submis-
sions under the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/
5888.php) and Annex I Party Submissions of information on forest management reference levels (http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-kp/
items/5896.php). The average FM net removal data considers average values for the years 2008 and 2009. For parties not electing
FM, data on Forest land remaining forest land reported to the UNFCCC has been used as a proxy.
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tries the new cap raises the total amount of incentiv-
ized carbon removals dramatically, on average some
10-fold (Fig. 5). Weighted across all Annex I countries
by the relative size of the forest resource, the new cap
increases the total amount of incentivized carbon by a
significantly smaller amount, approximately 70%.
Larger change in some countries is primarily the result
of the more idiosyncratic caps adopted for the first CP,
where countries chose between different options (the
smaller of either 3% of 1990 emissions or 15% of 1990
net removals, or an independently negotiated amount).
Japan, for example, negotiated a cap equal to 100% of
total annual net growth for the 1st CP. For the 2nd CP
based on the 3.5% rule, this amount has been reduced
(by 7%). Moreover, as the United States, Russia, and
Canada do not plan to participate in CP2, the overall
impact on incentivized carbon removals – although still
large for individual countries – will be much smaller
than hoped: the United States, Canada, Russia, and
Japan alone account for approximately 60% of the new
cap and an even larger share of total forest cover.
For many countries, even with large increases in the
new cap it may be difficult to benefit without signifi-
cant efforts. Additional average carbon sequestration
(net removals) under FM across 2008–2009 (after sub-
tracting the new reference level, below which countries
are not eligible for carbon credits) was frequently well
below the level of the new cap (Fig. 5: green bar com-
pared with red bar). Only a few countries have average
net removals above the reference line that are also well
above the new cap (Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Poland,
Finland, NZ, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Austria,
Japan, Latvia, and Slovenia). For this latter set of coun-
tries, the new cap may not be large enough to encour-
age significant additional growth in the net forest sink.
Moreover, under appropriate demand conditions, coun-
tries with no additional cap may be inclined to harvest
additional growth, as this will not result in the loss of
carbon credits. For many countries that already foresee
an increase in the harvest in CP2, it may be particularly
difficult to achieve increased growth and thus take
advantage of the new cap.
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Fig. 5 Change in cap across Old CP1 and New CP2 Rules. Sources: Based on 2011 Annex I Party GHG Inventory Submissions
under the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/5888.
php), Annex I Party Submissions of information on forest management reference levels (http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-kp/items/
5896.php), Decision 16/CMP.1 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf), and Decision 2/CMP.7 (http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf). The average FM net removal data (green columns) consider average values for the
years 2008 and 2009. For parties not electing FM, data on Forest land remaining forest land reported to the UNFCCC has been used
as a proxy. Note: Countries are ordered by the largest increase in the cap from CP1 to CP2 (the Netherlands) to the largest reduction
(Canada). Monaco, Iceland, and Australia previously had no cap under CP1. Furthermore, although not included here, the US cap
has been increased by 81% and the Russian Federation cap reduced by 3%.
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The second big change resulting from the Durban
conclusions is that FM reporting will become manda-
tory. Thus all Parties will be required to submit data
for FM and will be subject to the cap requirements. In
Fig. 6, we estimate the total IG under CP2 based on the
new cap approved in Durban. We have ultimately
elected to measure the IG under the new system in two
ways. Countries have made assumptions about the
future use of available forest resources without more
powerful incentives for carbon sequestration (net remo-
vals) and additional increased forest growth in place.
One strong assumption made by many Annex I coun-
tries is that the harvested share of the annual net incre-
ment will increase. Thus, as demonstrated for example
in Table 4, the vast majority of Annex I countries are
predicting significant drops in forest-related carbon
sequestration (net removals) in CP2 compared with
CP1. The only real exception here is Canada, which
expects a quite significant increase in net annual
growth (after harvest) of 281%. Assuming a different
set of incentives, it may be reasonable to assume a
modification in behavior.
We attempt to illustrate potential differences in the
IG by comparing it with both the average net annual
growth (after harvest) over the period 2008–2009 and
with projected CP2 felling rates (only the first of these
two options is depicted in Fig. 6). There is little sur-
prise in the fact that the relative size of the IG is greater
when measured against actual accounted carbon
sequestration (net removals) in CP1 compared with the
net annual growth projections for CP2. This suggests
the potential incentives created by a more complete
accounting of total potential net annual forest growth
in the carbon accounting procedures could have a posi-
tive impact. On the other hand, both estimates indicate
that, with the introduction of the new Durban rules,
the total relative size of the IG has been significantly
reduced in CP2. Averaged across all Parties, the IG has
been reduced by approximately 50% (from 88% to
43%). However, weighted by relative forest growth
0%
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30%
40%
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60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
CP1
CP2
66%
cap
IG
Average
CP1  88%
CP2 43%
Weighted Average
CP1  89%
CP2
Country by Country
Fig. 6 Incentive Gap based on old/new rules (cap/FM net removals). CP1 represents the current cap relative to 2008–2009 FM net
removals. CP2 represents the new cap vs. 2008–2009 FM net removals. For the CP1 estimate parties not electing FM in CP1 or hav-
ing a negotiated cap for 1st, IG = 100%. For the CP2 estimate all parties are included. The ‘average’ is the average of individual
IG’s. The weighted average is the total mobilized cap in each commitment period relative to total FM net removals 2008–2009.
Sources: Based on 2011 Annex I Party GHG Inventory Submissions under the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/national_reports/
annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/5888.php), Annex I Party Submissions of information on forest
management reference levels (http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-kp/items/5896.php), Decision 16/CMP.1 (http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf), and Decision 2/CMP.7 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf). The aver-
age FM net removal data considers average values for the years 2008 and 2009. For parties not electing FM, data on Forest land
remaining forest land reported to the UNFCCC has been used as a proxy.
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across all Annex I countries, the reduction in the incen-
tivized share is smaller (from 88% to 66%).
The above data likewise suggest the relative size of
the IG is strongly impacted by changes in forest har-
vesting practice. Increases in forest outtakes compete
with potential increases in the forest sink. For this rea-
son, we think it is important to fully incentivize this
margin. Even with the changes brought about by the
new Durban COP17 LULUCF rules, the new cap still
fails to incentivize a significant share of forest removals
(IG = 43–66%). Thus a significant share of forest cover
is still not effectively mobilized in the climate change
mitigation and adaptation framework. The margin
between forest fellings and future carbon sequestration,
in particular, is shielded from a weighting that could
facilitate a more balanced and efficient use of forest-
based resources. Further, because no net forest growth
above the cap is incentivized, an incentive remains to
harvest forest growth above the cap.
This analysis, however, neglects one important aspect
that we treat in greater detail below: the introduction
of an FM reference line (FMRL) at the 2011 Durban
LULUCF agreement. As described in Table 5, countries
are not permitted to account for carbon credits between
0 and the projected reference line (the FMRL). The
FMRL reference line represents either a business-
as-usual projection, historical data, or is set to zero (as in
the case of Japan). Whereas previously countries could
not be penalized for net emissions and/or harvesting
below the cap, under CP2, all countries will be held
accountable for any and all net emissions and/or har-
vesting below the reference level (FMRL) and are only
eligible for carbon credits between the reference level and
the cap.
The incentive gap continued
The methodology employed significantly affects the
relative size of the IG. Thus far we have measured the
IG as a function of the ‘share of carbon sequestration
(net removals) not incentivized in the regulatory frame-
work’. However, other measurements are possible. As
suggested above, the failure to incorporate HWP into
the carbon accounting framework, or the role of omit-
ted carbon pools (such as unmanaged forests) can also
be thought of as failures to incentivize carbon seques-
tration. Figure 7 attempts to provide a more complete
Table 4 Comparison of reported, average CP1 net FM
removals (2008–2009) with projected removals (FMRL) for CP2
All parties
Projections Change (CP2/CP1)
2008–2009 2013–2020 Reductions Increases
Australia 63.28939 8.5 113%
Austria 16.74975 2.121 87%
Belarus 28.557785 30.5 7%
Belgium 3.108065 2.407 23%
Bulgaria 12.08121 8.168 32%
Canada 18.50992 70.6 281%
Croatia 8.6179472 6.289 27%
Cyprus None 0.164
Czech
Republic
5.4225716 2.697 50%
Denmark 3.6980544 0.334 109%
Estonia 2.21796 1.742 21%
Finland 44.126223 19.3 56%
France 75.20376 63.109 16%
Germany 20.541325 2.067 90%
Greece 1.9947654 1.83 8%
Hungary 2.3379234 0.892 62%
Iceland 0.09465 0.154 63%
Ireland 2.847445 0.008 100%
Italy 49.785719 21.182 57%
Japan 47.19728 37.8 20%
Kazakhstan 1.81983 1.81983 0%
Latvia 22.350461 14.255 36%
Liechtenstein 0.018315 0.0025 86%
Lithuania 4.0867876 4.139 1%
Luxembourg 0.37777 0.418 11%
Malta 0.048685 0.049 1%
Monaco 0 0 0%
Netherlands 2.073815 1.464 29%
New Zealand 1.54332 11.15 622%
Norway 32.733225 25.51 22%
Poland 43.75179 22.75 48%
Portugal 8.5063107 6.48 24%
Romania 22.942722 15.444 33%
Russian
Federation
504.39124 246.8 51%
Slovakia 2.249335 0.358 116%
Slovenia 10.299651 3.033 71%
Spain 18.586164 20.81 12%
Sweden 41.207011 36.057 12%
Switzerland 0.9196591 0.22 124%
Ukraine 54.228392 48.7 10%
United
Kingdom
10.254284 3.442 66%
US 790.57597 774.76445 2%
Average 48.201459 35.152518 65% 54%
Weighted
Average
1976.2598 1476.4058 25%
Negative numbers indicate a removal, positive numbers an emission.
Sources: Based onAnnex I Party Submissions of information on for-
est management reference levels (http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-
kp/items/5896.php) and Decision 2/CMP.7 (http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf). The average FM net
removal data consider average values for the years 2008 and 2009.
Table 5 One- and two-way accounting and incentives under
CP2
0 – FMRL Deforestation yes, net removals no
FMRL – cap Yes (two-way)
Cap – Total FM removal Not accounted/incentivized
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picture of the IG from introducing CP2 rules and consid-
ers all of the LULUCF-based components under Arts.
3.3 (ARD) and 3.4 (FM) – including harvested growth –
based on CP1 and CP2 rules. Figure 7 studies the IG
represented by growth (living biomass). Growth is
indirectly calculated from harvests using FAO data and
net removals of living biomass based on UNFCCC data.
To illustrate the consequences of the new 3.5% cap,
we assume a 20% increase in growth between CP1 and
CP2. Instead of using a projected reference line, we use
the average growth at CP1 recorded in 2008 and 2009
as a baseline for estimating the outcome in CP2. We
feel this assumption is warranted. Averaged across all
Annex I countries, during 2008 and 2009, countries
averaged approximately 3% growth per year. Given
7 years of growth over the period 2013–2020, this
comes to approximately 21% total growth. On the other
hand, weighted across all Annex I countries, the aver-
age rate of growth in 2008–2009 is significantly smaller,
approximately 1.2% yr1.
The IG estimated in Fig. 7 deviates somewhat from
that estimated in Figs. 4 and 6. In this illustration, we
incorporate harvested growth, dividing this quantity in
the figure into HWP and bioenergy production and
estimating the degree to which this share of FM is in-
centivized. A number of important conclusions can be
drawn from this illustration. First, in CP1, the IG is
again quite large (on average 75%, or a weighted 76%).
As bioenergy is included and fully incentivized (bioen-
ergy emissions are considered neutral), the total IG is
somewhat smaller in CP1 than when harvested growth
is not included in the model. At the same time, how-
ever, the relative magnitude of the IG, due in particular
to the failure to incentivize HWP under CP1, is signifi-
cantly large: in CP1, HWP alone is equivalent to 43% of
the IG, or approximately 1062 MtCO2, compared to
only 687 MtCO2 removals in FM above the cap. Thus,
although the percentages do not change much, the
amounts of potential carbon sequestration behind these
numbers are large.
CP 1 CP 2FM up to cap (8.6%) FM including HWP around FMRL and
new cap (12%)
Growth
100%
Growth
120%
ARD (6.1%)
Bioenergy (9%)
ARD (7%)
FM including HWP
around zero and FMRL (22%)
Bioenergy (9%)
HWP (43%)
IG = 49IG 76%
FM including HWP above cap (48%)
  –
71%
 = 
FM above cap (28%)
Managed Forests (4%)
Unmanaged Forests (1.1%) Unmanaged Forests (1.1%)
Fig. 7 IG CP1 based on 20% Total Growth Estimate for CP2. Sources: Based on own calculations and 2011 Annex I Party GHG
Inventory Submissions under the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_sub
missions/items/5888.php), Annex I Party Submissions of information on forest management reference levels (http://unfccc.int/
bodies/awg-kp/items/5896.php) and Decision 2/CMP.7 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf). Note:
Orange represents nonincentivized forest growth, green incentivized, and gray (between zero growth and the FMRL) is only subject
to one-directional negative and not positive incentives. Net emissions and/or harvesting below the reference level will be debited,
whereas growth up to the reference line is not eligible for carbon credits. Estimates are based on own calculations using UNFCCC
submission data and data from FAO (2010). As a simulation and estimate of potential future growth in 2020 (based on the assump-
tion of increased growth of 20% up to 2020), several things remain unknown in the figure above. We do not know, for example,
how this growth, if it in fact occurs at all, will be distributed across HWP, FM net removals, and bioenergy. We can only estimate
broad relationships. And it is important to note these estimates of future growth well exceed those of the Parties to the current
agreement, who all predict significantly less growth or higher harvests in the future (as illustrated, for example, by the projected ref-
erence lines (FMRL’s) reproduced in Table 4).
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, GCB Bioenergy, 5, 599–622
THE INCENTIVE GAP BEFORE AND AFTER DURBAN 617
The mandatory inclusion of FM and HWP in CP2
has significantly improved the model. Under CP2, a
greater share of carbon sequestration (net removals)
and/or harvested growth is fully incentivized. Based
on an assumption of 20% growth from CP1 to the end
of CP2, most Annex I Parties would be able to claim
the full cap. Thus a large number of countries would
benefit from the new cap in the sense that they would
be able to claim more carbon credits than before. On
the other hand, the new cap limits the incentive to
increase the sink because for many of these same
countries (29 of 37), no additional room would be
available under the cap that would incentivize addi-
tional forest growth. Thus although Sweden, for
example, still has considerable potential for increasing
forest growth, no incentives in the KP approach mobi-
lize this potential, thereby potentially limiting invest-
ments in larger forest projects. This raises important
questions about the impact and utility of the new cap.
While it may limit the ability of some countries to
take advantage of large forest areas, it simultaneously
reduces incentives to pursue additional forest cover
and growth and raises incentives to increase harvest.
In this sense, tying the new cap to 1990 GHG emis-
sions likewise makes little sense, as this number is not
linked in any meaningful way with forest potential.
Under the current climate context, this is presumably
not a positive outcome.
A second ‘gray area’ is that share of forest removals
that falls within the range between 0 growth and the
reference line (indicated in gray under CP2). This area
constitutes an important share of total forest removals –
on average some 22% of total forest removals. Under
the new Durban model, however, these removals are
no longer eligible for carbon credits and, in this sense,
are not incentivized. At the same time, there are incen-
tives not to allow forest growth to fall below the FMRL:
countries can be debited for any and all deforestation
below the reference line.
Finally, as many countries have estimated quite low
levels of net forest removals in CP2, it is possible
many countries will be hard pressed to even rise above
the individual reference lines set in the Durban
LULUCF agreement. The FMRL strategy was ultimately
justified with the intent of protecting country Kyoto
commitments to achieve emission reductions. In this
way, countries would not be able to amass large
amounts of forest-based net removal carbon credits and
count them against their Kyoto emission reduction
commitments. Moreover, because the FMRL was gener-
ally set at the level of previous growth rates, countries
would have to struggle to arrive above the FMRL and
thus be eligible to receive additional forest-based car-
bon credits. On the other hand, an incentive exists to
estimate a lower FMRL to increase the opportunity for
carbon credits. Although we cannot easily know which
factors most strongly influence Party projections, aver-
age observed FM removals for 2008–2009 provide a
potentially interesting point of comparison.
What this means, however, for HWP and additional
FM removals not weighted according to their true
global warming (or cooling) potential remains uncer-
tain. We have argued here and elsewhere (Ellison et al.,
2011a) that to place HWP and standing forests on an
equal footing with bioenergy, they must be weighted in
the same way. The new CP2 strategy from Durban
essentially makes this impossible. Moreover, this
approach ultimately means individual forest owners
who make efforts to raise the total level of forest
growth may not or may only receive partial compensa-
tion for their efforts.
Depending on whether one includes this gray area
in the IG measure, we estimate the potential weighted
IG in CP2 at between 49 and 71%, depending on how
one considers the gray area (the unweighted averages
are 38 and 61%). However, we stress that our esti-
mates based on 20% growth by 2020 will exceed those
of the individual Parties based on their estimated
FMRL’s.
The global context
Without effective strategies for incorporating this
additional forest cover into an incentivized LULUCF
framework, much of this forest area will not be ade-
quately mobilized. Doing so, however, would go a long
way to promoting increased global forest cover and
growth.
We estimate total global forest cover at approxi-
mately 4033 million hectares (based on FAO data). Of
this total, only a very small amount is currently incen-
tivized in the Kyoto framework. Art. 3.3 (AR) alone,
although fully incentivized under the KP framework,
only covers some 0.2% of total global forest cover.
While the actual amount of fully incentivized potential
forest cover is greater than this amount – additional
land can always be dedicated to ARD – the total
amount of available land is limited to some extent by
other land-use practices (agriculture, urban develop-
ment, etc.). In addition, as we have demonstrated
above, only a very small share of FM land is ade-
quately incentivized under CP1. In this figure we esti-
mate the IG at 86% of land under FM. Together, this
suggests that only 3% of total potential forest cover
(approximately 117 million hectares) is incentivized in
the Kyoto framework. A very large amount of forest
cover, on the other hand, is not incentivized or is only
weakly incentivized. Our total estimate suggests some
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97% of forest cover (approximately 3916 million hect-
ares) is not or is only weakly incentivized.
The Durban changes to the Kyoto framework for CP2
represent only a marginal change in this regard. If all
Annex I countries continue to participate in the Kyoto
process, this would potentially raise the total incentiv-
ized area to approximately 7% of total global forest
cover (by approximately doubling the current amount
of incentivized forest cover under FM). However, the
United States, Canada, Japan, and Russia, four of the
largest forest cover countries (making up more than
80% of the total forest area and 60% of total seques-
tered carbon potential across these and the remaining
Annex I countries), have already indicated they will
not participate in CP2 (or, as in the case of the United
States, will fail to finally ratify the KP). Thus the total
impact of the adjusted ruling under KP CP2 will be
quite small.
The total amount of global incentivized forest in
Fig. 8 misses reafforestation arising from REDD+ and
the CDM market. However, according to Ecosystem
Marketplace (2011), in 2010, the total CDM market
amounted to only 19.5 MtCO2e (million tonnes carbon
dioxide equivalents). Of the total ARD segment (Annex
I ARD+ REDD+), this represents a total of only 19%,
23% of the Annex I ARD segment, or .05% of total glo-
bal potential. Thus, although the emergence of the
REDD+ market is encouraging, much more could be
done to integrate the world’s forests into the Kyoto
framework. The incorporation of LULUCF into the
EU’s climate policy framework, for example, and the
potential for trading CDM forest-based carbon credits
could go a long way to further mobilizing REDD+
potential.
Thus, much could still be gained by further reforms
of carbon accounting practices under the Kyoto Protocol
and its future variants. In particular, there are substan-
tial benefits to finding a suitable framework for encour-
aging additional countries to become Parties to the KP
arrangement and thereby increasing the share of incen-
tivized forest cover. Ellison et al. (2011a) suggest the
introduction of a ‘conditionality principle’ only allowing
those countries that sign onto the KP agreement and
make formal emission reduction commitments to sell
forest-based carbon credits in the Kyoto carbon-trading
framework. While currently much effort is invested in
REDD+, a revised model could potentially provide a
more suitable framework for rapid progress.
Evaluating potential change in carbon sequestration
(net removals)
At heart, a certain impossibility inhabits the evaluation
of the potential impact on change in LULUCF carbon
sequestration (net removals) that could result from a
rewriting of the KP LULUCF rules. To some degree we
cannot know with any accuracy how actors might be
influenced by the changing structure of incentives.
Fig. 8 Global Incentivized Forest Area under the Kyoto Protocol (CP1). Note: Based on CP1 rules. The total share of incentivized
forest cover will increase under CP2 rules. Sources: Based on own calculations and 2011 Annex I Party GHG Inventory Submissions
under the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/5888.
php) and data from FAO (2010).
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Moreover, much depends on how individual Parties (or
EU Member states) might ultimately decide to integrate
suitable incentive structures into practice at the national
level.
According to FAO data, global carbon stocks in
forests are estimated at 652 371 million tons 2010
(stocks). The corresponding figure for Annex I coun-
tries is 249 923 million tons 2010 (carbon Annex I) or
38% of the global stock. Between 2005 and 2010 the car-
bon stock has remained quite stable at the global scale.
Based on growing stock (stem volume), only 3% of the
current stock is found on ‘other wooded land’ and 97%
on forest land. The amount of change in global forest
stocks between 2005 and 2010 has been small.
However, forest productivity and cover has changed
significantly over time in many European countries.
These changes are the result of two distinct processes.
One of them is the increased degree of reafforestation.
UNFCCC processes that encourage individual Parties
to promote increased rates of afforestation and that
have contributed to the development of EU-level efforts
as well have favored such developments. Funding
through the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
in particular, has led to significantly increased rates of
afforestation. Spain, for example, by taking advantage
of almost 50% of EU CAP afforestation resources, man-
aged to raise total forest cover by some 50% between
1990 and 2000.
The other process that has significantly altered
forest growth and productivity is change in FM prac-
tices. Countries like Spain, Germany, the Netherlands,
Austria, and several others (Table 6) have substan-
tially increased the total amount of growing stock, sig-
nificantly raising total biomass production (and thus
carbon sequestration) over the last several decades.
For those countries for which we have adequate data
over the time period (1950–2010), many of them have
more than doubled their total available growing stock
per hectare. Only one country has witnessed a rise
and then a decline in total available growing stock
over this period (Portugal), and Greece has seen total
forest productivity decline consistently over the entire
period. Likewise, despite an obvious interest in
increasing the total growing stock, only three
countries simultaneously witnessed a decline in total
removals during this same period (Italy, Greece, and
Romania).
Thus, it seems likely that other countries could also
increase their total available growing stock. Verkerk
et al. (2011), for example, suggest considerable additional
Table 6 Change in forest growing stock (1950–2010)
Forest land in use (Mha) Growing stock (Mm³ ob) Removals (Mm3)
Growing stock per
hectare (m3 ha1)
Change in
growing
stock per
hectare
1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 2010/1950
Spain 12.5 10.1 8.39 18.2 97 436 591 912 1.9 13.7 15.6 15.6 8 43 70 50 547%
Germany 9.48 10.1 10.5 11.1 878 1372 2815 3492 36.0 37.2 84.7 54.4 93 136 268 315 240%
Belgium 0.6 0.6 0.71 0.68 46 71 128 168 2.0 2.6 5.6 4.8 77 118 182 248 224%
Netherlands 0.25 0.4 0.33 0.37 15 20 52 70 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.1 60 50 156 192 220%
Austria 3.14 4.5 3.88 3.89 348 681 947 1135 9.4 11.8 16.8 17.8 111 151 244 292 163%
Hungary 1.25 1.5 1.68 2.03 85 174 288 359 2.2 5.0 6.0 5.7 68 116 172 177 161%
Ireland 0.12 0.3 0.4 0.74 4.8 15 61.5 74.3 0.2 0.4 1.6 2.8 39 50 155 101 160%
Italy 5.65 7.3 6.75 9.15 329 286 926 1384 13.5 11.7 8.0 7.3 58 39 137 151 160%
Luxembourg 0.08 0.1 0.09 10.1 13 20.4 26 0.2 0.3 125 130 299 140%
Bulgaria 2.96 4 3.39 3.93 210 264 405 656 5.6 5.1 4.1 5.7 71 66 120 167 136%
France 11.3 14 13.1 16 805 1307 2077 2584 26.7 37.9 62.6 55.5 71 93 158 162 127%
Denmark 0.44 0.5 0.47 0.54 40 45 64.9 108 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.7 91 90 139 199 118%
Great Britain 1.56 1.6 2.21 2.88 94.6 121 282 379 3.3 3.5 6.4 9.7 61 76 128 132 117%
Poland 7.1 8.6 8.67 9.34 1049 1485 2049 12.0 18.5 17.6 35.5 122 171 219 80%
Finland 20.7 19.1 20.1 22.2 1159 1445 1878 2189 40.8 45.1 43.2 51.0 56 76 93 99 76%
Norway 5.3 8.3 8.7 10.1 321 513 701 987 10.2 8.5 11.8 10.4 61 62 81 98 62%
Sweden 22.9 24.7 24.4 28.2 1820 2288 2791 3358 38.2 60.0 52.9 70.2 79 93 114 119 50%
Switzerland 0.85 1 1.13 1.24 200 270 392 428 3.2 4.2 6.3 4.9 237 270 347 345 46%
Romania 6.33 6.5 6.19 6.57 1268 1348 1390 16.0 22.3 12.6 13.1 195 218 212 8%
Portugal 2.47 2.8 2.76 3.46 166 203 186 4.8 6.4 11.2 9.6 59 74 54 9%
Greece 2 2.7 2.51 3.9 129 150 156 185 3.9 3.0 2.5 1.7 65 56 62 47 27%
Source: Based on FAO data.
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‘theoretical’ forest potential could be achieved with
appropriate changes in FM practices. Moreover,
although Verkerk et al. do not estimate the potential
impact of changing land-use practices – in particular
conversion of unused or former agricultural lands to
forest – this area too represents potential for increased
forest cover.
Conclusion
In many ways, the 2011 Durban agreement on LULUCF
carbon accounting practices represents a significant step
forward. The transition from voluntary to mandatory
reporting now means countries are unable to utilize FM
as a framework for avoiding the cost of increased forest
harvesting and/or disguising deforestation. Second, the
transition to the new cap likewise represents a step for-
ward, as a significantly larger share of the forest sink is
now incentivized.
In equity terms, however, the new cap could have
been thought through more carefully. It remains
unclear why heavy per capita emitters in 1990 should be
rewarded with a higher cap than low emitters. More-
over, it remains unclear why FM caps should be based
on a metric that has nothing to do with forest cover or
potential. Likewise, it remains unclear why the new
cap does not take the share of forest cover under FM
into account. Under the 1st Commitment Period
(2008–2012) countries could either adopt a cap equal to
the smaller of two options (3% of 1990 emissions, or
15% of net removals in forests), or negotiate an alterna-
tive cap. No adjustments have so far been made under
the new model.
As indicated in Table 3 above and argued through-
out, a number of hurdles need to be cleared to ade-
quately incentivize the effective, efficient, and balanced
use of forest resources. This can only be effectively
done when all forest resources are accounted based on
their real global warming (cooling) potentials. The
greatest obstacles in our view are the existence of a
‘cap’, the presence of omitted carbon pools that are not
integrated into single all-encompassing national inven-
tories, the inclusion of a reference level (FMRL), and
the artificial division of LULUCF pools into Art. 3.3
(ARD) and Art. 3.4 (FM).
An additional impact likely to emerge from this
arrangement is that more Parties to the agreement may
feel pressured to move toward national-level setting of
the permissible felling rate. This is likely to occur
because countries will be held accountable in the 2nd
CP (and beyond) for net emissions and/or harvesting
below the reference level. Haphazard or noncoordinated
management of the felling rate could ultimately lead
some countries to fall below the reference level in indi-
vidual years. This amount is already nationally or
regionally negotiated in some of the timber-rich states
(e.g., Finland). Although we think of this as a positive
outcome, we favor the elimination of reference levels.
The continued emphasis on a ‘cap’ ultimately means
that a large number of countries are not adequately
incentivized to pursue additional forest growth. This
appears to affect, above all, heavily forested countries,
as these countries are likely to exhibit forest growth in
excess of the new cap (see also Ellison et al., 2012c).
This has the unfortunate consequence that countries
potentially among the best positioned to increase forest
growth (e.g., those countries with strong FM traditions)
will not be incentivized through the new cap to further
increase their forest sink and could adopt the alterna-
tive strategy of raising the harvest.
Likewise, the inclusion of a reference level essentially
means not all forest-based resources are accounted
based on their real potential. Thus both HWP and FM
removals, as they do not yield carbon credits, are not
fully incentivized in the new system. Although we
understand and appreciate the reasons for doing this
(to protect Party emission reduction commitments), in
the long run such a system does not seem viable. This
model continues to favor bioenergy over other uses of
forest-based resources. Thus, in the long run, we think
commitments should be set after the rules for LULUCF-
based carbon accounting. In this sense, we suggest else-
where (Ellison et al., 2012c) that the reference line
approach is perhaps best utilized as part of the meth-
odology for helping countries set overall emission
reduction targets, rather than setting limits on the
potential for Parties to gain carbon credits.
Finally, the greatest potential for increased forest
removals will ultimately come from bringing new
countries into the Kyoto Protocol fold. Based on CP1,
some 97% of forest-based resources remain nonincen-
tivized for increased forest-based carbon sequestration.
Although the new cap under CP2 lowers this amount,
the Kyoto Protocol has lost (or failed to win over)
potential member states whose potential contribution to
forest-based carbon sequestration is large (in particular
Canada, Russia, and the United States). Moreover, how
and in what ways other states will eventually be more
fully incorporated into this framework remains to be
seen. While REDD+ may represent a step in the right
direction, this initiative still represents a small share of
the world’s forests.
As noted at the outset, our measure of the missed
opportunities in the Kyoto and UNFCCC framework
remains significantly large, despite the considerable
advances in LULUCF accounting made at the 2011 Dur-
ban meetings. The climate challenge, however, is such
that we think this remaining forest potential can and
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, GCB Bioenergy, 5, 599–622
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must be utilized. Moreover, by expanding this frame-
work to as large a set of Parties as possible, a signifi-
cant contribution could potentially be made to reducing
or eliminating current rates of global deforestation.
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